Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Popular Media

Faculty Scholarship

1-15-2019

Mystery Subpoena Case at Supreme Court Could Expand US
Authority
Peter B. Rutledge
University of Georgia Law School, borut@uga.edu

Amanda W. Newton
University of Georgia School of Law

Repository Citation
Rutledge, Peter B. and Newton, Amanda W., "Mystery Subpoena Case at Supreme Court Could Expand US
Authority" (2019). Popular Media. 300.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_pm/300

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Popular Media by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Mystery Subpoena Case at Supreme Court
Could Expand US Authority
The D. C. Circuit’s underlying decision expands the possibility
that a federal criminal subpoena could override a claim of
sovereign immunity when also coupled with an invocation of a
foreign blocking statute.
By Peter B. “Bo” Rutledge and Amanda W. Newton – January 15, 2019
Rare Supreme Court holiday activity and ongoing news coverage about special
counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation has drawn much attention to the
enigmatic case of In Re Grand Jury Subpoena. In some regards, the matter is
unremarkable, presenting familiar issues of international litigation. Upon
further examination, however, the case—about which little is publicly
known—may have the potential to expand the authority of United States
courts over foreign states and their agencies or instrumentalities.

In re Grand Jury Subpoena began when a foreign state-owned corporate entity
refused to comply with a subpoena issued by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia during a grand jury investigation of an
undisclosed criminal matter. After the court issued its subpoena, the
corporation filed a motion to quash, arguing that its status as a state-owned
corporation ensured protection by foreign sovereign immunity and that
compliance with the subpoena would force the corporation to violate the laws
of its state of incorporation.

Issues of this sort are hardly novel. Courts routinely grapple with claims
of sovereign immunity (including in cases involving subpoenas and other
forms of compulsory judicial process) and with claims that compliance with
discovery requests would violate foreign law. Indeed, over a century ago,
cases like In re Balz and Ex Parte Hirtz addressed claims about a party’s
foreign immunity affecting their amenability to jurisdiction and other forms of
process. (Notably, the court rendered these decisions during a time when
common law largely governed the contours of immunity from process, a topic
to which we’ll return.)

More recently, the Supreme Court held in Republic of Argentina v. NML
Capital that sovereign immunity did not categorically excuse private third
parties from complying with post-judgment discovery orders enforcing a
federal court judgment against a foreign sovereign. Similarly, decisions like
Judge Frank Easterbrook’s colorful opinion for the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in the 1990 Reinsurance case have wrestled with conflicts
between American discovery law and foreign blocking statutes, including in
cases where the party invoking the foreign blocking statute bears some
juridical relationship to the foreign sovereign.

In re Grand Jury Subpoena takes place against this familiar backdrop, but with
the added twist that the criminal grand jury subpoena was issued to a foreign
corporation in which, at the time of the subpoena’s issuance, a foreign
sovereign likely had at least a direct majority ownership (based on application
of the Supreme Court’s test in Dole Food v. Patrickson).

Under consistent Supreme Court case law, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act is the “sole basis” for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign or
state-owned entity. Because the FSIA confers jurisdiction only in “nonjury civil
action[s],” the corporation argued that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case.

The D.C. District and Circuit courts promptly rejected the jurisdictional
argument, finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which provides for jurisdiction over
“all offenses against the laws of the United States,” supplemented the FSIA’s
grant of jurisdiction over foreign state-owned entities in criminal cases. To
hold otherwise, the D.C. Circuit reasoned, would “completely insulate” foreign
corporations from criminal liability.

The D.C. Circuit then assumed that sovereign immunity would lie in a criminal
case before determining that the FSIA’s exceptions to sovereign immunity
were germane because they pertained to “any case,” rather than “any civil
action.” The court found one such exception satisfied and, after determining
that the corporation failed to prove that foreign law prohibited compliance,
ordered the corporation to comply with the subpoena.

The long-term impact of the D.C. Circuit’s decision may be twofold. First, in
light of the Supreme Court’s refusal to stay the subpoena’s enforcement
(following a brief respite from Chief Justice Roberts), the D. C. Circuit’s

decision expands the possibility that a federal criminal subpoena could
override a claim of sovereign immunity when also coupled with an invocation
of a foreign blocking statute.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the decision may illuminate the
viability of the “common law” doctrine governing immunity from process. The
D.C. Circuit’s comment that “the immunity defense [in a criminal case] was a
creature of the common law” has led some to argue that foreign state entities
are still entitled to common law immunity, while others have suggested that
In re Grand Jury Subpoena confirms that the FSIA is the exclusive source of
exceptions to sovereign immunity.

Thus, the more-lasting impact of the D.C. Circuit’s decision may be to retest
the relationship between the FSIA’s reticulated framework and common law
decisions like Balz and Hirtz. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Samantar that federal common law continues to govern foreign official
immunity (as opposed to foreign sovereign immunity), the debate rages on
over what body of law (and ultimately what branch of government) sets the
boundaries of immunity for a foreign sovereign (or its agency or
instrumentality) from federal criminal process.

Nevertheless, predicting the gravity of In re Grand Jury Subpoena is difficult,
because little is known about the case other than what is stated in the short,
three-page opinion by the D.C. Circuit. The matter has been kept wholly under
seal, protected by security so tight that the entire floor of the D.C. Circuit’s
courthouse was emptied while the three-person panel heard arguments on
Oct. 14. That secrecy has led to speculation that the subpoena is part of the
larger investigation by special counsel Robert Mueller into Russia’s influence
in the 2016 presidential election, and decisions on the stay applications by
Chief Justice Roberts and the Supreme Court have done little to dampen the
theory.

Regardless of its potentially inflammatory political consequences, In re Grand
Jury Subpoena could change the landscape of criminal subpoenas in the United
States. The bar should watch carefully for how the courts interpret the
relationship between the FSIA and common law and, more broadly, the
collision between American compulsory process and foreign blocking statutes
(especially in cases involving sovereigns or their agencies and
instrumentalities).

Peter B. “Bo” Rutledge is dean of the University of Georgia School of Law, where
he holds the Herman Talmadge Chair of Law. A former clerk to U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Clarence Thomas, Rutledge pursues teaching and research
of international dispute resolution, arbitration, international business
transactions and the U.S. Supreme Court.
Amanda W. Newton is a third-year law student and research clerkship and merit
scholarship recipient at the University of Georgia School of Law. In addition to
serving as a research assistant for the dean of the law school, she is a member of
the executive board on the Journal of Intellectual Property Law, a representative
on the Honor Court and a dean’s ambassador.

